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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Is there substantial conflicting evidence for the
Industrial Commission to reject the medical panel's report, the
original treating physician's opinion, and the Administrative
Law Judge's finding on the period of temporary disability from
the accident.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Section 35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated, determines the outcome of this case.

The relevant parts state:

. . . [T]he commission shall refer the medical
aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by
the commission. . . . The medical panel shall make
such study . . . and thereafter shall make a report in
writing to the commission. . . . If no objections are
so filed [to the medical panel report] . . ., the
report shall be deemed admitted in evidence and the
commission may base its finding and decision on the
report of the panel, but shall not be bound by such
report if there is substantial conflicting evidence in
the case which supports a contrary finding by the
commission.
(See Appendix "A" for the entire text of the statute.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Background.

This case arises under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Delbert W. Wallace ("Wallace") filed an application for hearing
on December 14, 1983.

(R. 9)

report on October 30, 1984.
to the medical panel report.

The medical panel filed its
(R. 170) No objections were filed
(R. 197)

On January 24, 1985,

the Administrative Law Judge entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order adopting the medical panel's report
on temporary disability from the accident.

(R. 196-204)

On

August 7, 1985, the Industrial Commission, with Chairman
Stephen M. Hadley dissenting, entered an Order reversing the
Administrative Law Judge on the issue of temporary disability
by rejecting the medical panel report on temporary disability
in favor of what they inferred a doctor's opinion would be.
(R. 227-232)

Greyhound Lines, Inc. ("Greyhound") petitions for
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the reversal of this Order and the reinstatement of the original Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
B.

(R. 233)

Facts.

Wallace sustained an industrial accident with Greyhound on
December 18, 1981, when he slipped on some ice on the step of a
bus and fell.

(R. 1)

For seventeen years prior to this accident, Wallace had
substantial back problems.

In 1964 he injured his back while

lifting.

This required a laminectomy and discectomy.

(R. 174)

In 1967 he reinjured his back in an automobile

accident.

This lead to an L4 to SI fusion.

(R. 174)

Wallace

reinjured his back in another automobile accident in 1969.
(R. 174)

In 1970 Wallace was thrown from a horse again injur-

ing his back.

(R. 174, 175) While working in a nursing home

in 1973, Wallace again injured his back.

(R. 175)

Wallace

continued to receive extensive treatment for his back up until
three days before his December 18, 1981, accident.

(R. 99,

175, 176)
After the accident, Wallace treated with Dr. Culley K.
Christensen on December 21 and 28, 1985.

(R. 100)

Dr. Christensen estimated Wallace would be off work about three
months.

(R. 101)

On February 10, 1982, Dr. Christensen

released Wallace to return to work.

(R. 102)

On May 10, 1982,

Wallace saw Dr. Gene R. Smith for back problems.
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(R. 104)

Dr. Smith gave Wallace a return to work slip for May 22, 1982,
even though he did not take him off of work.

(R. 104, 105) By

his own admission Wallace took only one week off the job after
the accident until October 1982.

(R. 173)

In July 1982, Wallace again saw Dr. Smith for back pain.
On October 18, 1982, Dr. Smith released Wallace from work.

He

was then referred to Dr. Grant L. Christian for treatment of an
ulcer.

(R. 114)

On May 25, 1983, Dr. Smith stated that

Wallace should be rated and trained for work other than bus
driving.

(R. 133)

Dr. Smith was not aware that Wallace had

already been retrained and that Wallace elected to perform the
restricted work.

(R. 181) At the request of Greyhound,

Dr. Smith rated Wallace on November 29, 1983, while noting that
his condition remained fairly well stabilized.

(R. 138)

In evaluating Wallace, the medical panel determined that
there was "no evidence that his low back problem or lower
extremity radiation problem was worsened by the accident."
(R. 181)

The medical panel further found that the accident

caused a temporary aggravation of his pre-existing low back
problems for about three months.

(R. 182) All other treatment

was "necessitated by pre-existing and subsequently developing
conditions not caused by this industrial accident."

(R. 182)

When the Administrative Law Judge made his findings, he
adopted the three-month temporary total disability period
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suggested by the medical panel and the treating physician,
Dr. Christensen.

(R. 202) Although Wallace did object to a

setoff for overpayment of benefits, no one objected to the
temporary total disability period given by the medical panel
and used by the Administrative Law Judge.

After ruling in

Greyhound's favor on a setoff issue, the Industrial Commission
surprisingly addressed on its own the cutoff for temporary
total disability.

(R. 229, 230)

By a vote of 2-1 the

Commission rejected the three-month period.

(R. 230)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The medical panel determined that the industrial accident
caused a three-month aggravation of Wallace's long-standing
back problems.

When he began missing work again in late 1982,

it was due to his seventeen-year history of back problems, not
the industrial accident.

The medical history as well as the

treating physician's records (Dr. Christensen) agree with the
medical panel report.

The evidence does not support any other

conclusion.
Although the parties did not raise the issue, the
Industrial Commission reviewed and rejected the medical panel
report.

Without explaining how the medical panel report was

supposedly deficient or contrary to the evidence, the
Commission used a letter of Dr. Smith to infer Dr. Smith's
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opinion on temporary disability and medical causation.

In

doing so, the Commission erroneously assumed that the date a
permanent rating is given is the date of medical stabilization.

They also subverted the evidentiary process for receiv-

ing medical testimony.

And finally, the inference that

Dr. Smith would find the medical stabilization date to be the
date of the rating letter contradicted the letter itself as
well as the rest of Dr. Smith's records.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND MEDICAL PANEL
REPORT CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH THAT THERE WAS
ONLY A THREE-MONTH TEMPORARY DISABILITY FROM
THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT.
An employee injured by accident in the course of his
employment is entitled to compensation for the period he is
temporarily disabled.

U.C.A. § 35-1-65.

Temporary disability

ends when the condition caused by the accident becomes medically stable.
(1981) § 57.12.

2A Larson, The Law Of Workmen's Compensation
Since medical stabilization is a medical

question, it may be addressed by a medical panel.
Being at issue, the medical panel properly addressed
temporary disability and concluded:
. . . [Wallace] would [be] entitled to an approximate
three month's course of conservative treatment for
temporary aggravation of his lumbosacral spine
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problem . . . the rest of the treatment would appear
to have been necessitated by pre-existing and subsequently developing conditions not caused by this
industrial accident. (R. 182)
No objections were filed to the medical panel report so it
was admitted into evidence.

Pursuant to U.C.A. § 35-1-77, the

Industrial Commission must accept the medical panel report
unless there is substantial conflicting evidence.

The medical

evidence here substantially supports the medical panel report
on temporary disability.

First, Wallace actually returned to

work well within that time.

(R. 173)

Second, the treating

physician, Dr. Culley K. Christensen originally estimated a
three-month disability.

(R. 101)

Third, Dr. Christensen

returned Wallace to work well within the three-month period.
(R. 102)

Fourth, when Dr. Gene R. Smith first saw Wallace in

May 1982, after the three-month period, he did not then take
Wallace off of work.

(R. 104, 105) Fifth, when Wallace later

went off work in October 1982, it was for the medical problems
which pre-existed the industrial accident for which he had
received treatment for seventeen years prior to the industrial
accident.

(R. 173-183)

The medical panel report and medical evidence substantially
support the finding that there was only three months of temporary disability caused by the accident.
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POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S REJECTION OF THE
UNCONTESTED MEDICAL PANEL REPORT MISCONSTRUES THE NATURE OF A PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT
RATING, VIOLATES STATUTORY PROCEDURE FOR
RECEIVING MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND MISINTERPRETS
DR. SMITH'S RECORDS.
Since no one challenged the medical panel's conclusion on
temporary disability from the accident, it was very surprising
to see the Administrative Law Judge reversed on this issue.
The net effect and apparent reason for the reversal was to
obliterate Greyhound's credit for continuing payment pending a
final resolution.

The reasoning offered is very questionable.

The Commission claimed that Dr. Smith gave no release to work
date, the usual evidence of medical stabilization.

They

observed a letter of Dr. Smith dated November 29, 1983, giving
Wallace a permanent impairment rating.

Recognizing that medi-

cal stabilization must occur before permanent impairment is
rated, the Commission concluded that the date of the rating
letter was the date of stabilization.

(R. 230)

The most glaring deficiency in this reasoning rests on the
assumption that the date a permanent impairment rating is given
coincides with the date of medical stabilization.
this may happen, it is not necessarily true.

Although

As finally deter-

mined, Wallace had an impairment from his first surgery in
1964.

However, no rating was given until 1983.
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It would be

ludicrous to assert that he did not stabilize until the 1983
rating was given.

Many cases come to the Industrial Commission

where medical stabilization has occurred but no permanent
rating has been given.

The Commission has never suggested that

until a rating is given there is no medical stabilization.
To compound this error, the Commission inferred Dr. Smith's
opinion on medical stabilization in violation of statutory and
Commission procedure and without considering all of Dr. Smith's
records.
Commission procedure requires that any objections to the
medical panel report be filed in writing.

When objections are

filed, an evidentiary hearing is held to examine and crossexamine the medical witnesses.

In this manner, medical issues

in dispute can be fully and properly reviewed.
§ 35-1-77.

U.C.A.

Since no objections to the medical panel report

were filed, the various medical witnesses were not examined.
Had they been, Dr. Smith could have directly addressed the
issue of medical stabilization as well as the medical cause for
treatment in late 1982 and early 1983.

In rejecting the medi-

cal panel's report when no objections were filed and then
inferring what a physician's opinion would be, the Commission
subverted its own and statutory procedure depriving Greyhound
of the opportunity to obtain Dr. Smith's direct opinion.
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Even if it were proper to infer what Dr. Smith's opinion
would be, the Commission should at least have carefully studied
the letter upon which they relied as well as the other records
of Dr. Smith.

Had they done so, they would have found that the

November 29, 1983, letter condemns their reasoning.

The second

paragraph reads in its entirety:
The status remains fairly well stabilized in my
opinion. (R. 138)
That the status "remains" fairly well stabilized rules out any
possibility that stabilization occurred on the date of the
letter.

Dr. Smith's records also reveal that Dr. Smith thought

Wallace was medically stable when he first saw him in May 1982
(R. 104, 105) and again in May 1983 when Dr. Smith recommended
a rating be given.

(R. 133)

The erroneous logic, improper procedure and inaccurate
facts of the Industrial Commission show there is nothing to
support the Industrial Commission's rejection of the medical
panel report.
CONCLUSION
The Order of the Industrial Commission finding a temporary
disability cutoff date of November 29, 1983, should be rejected
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and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated
January 24, 1985, should be reinstated.
DATED this

*—

day of January, 1986.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
Henry
Attorneys
Inc.
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yhound Lines,

35-1-77. Medical panel—Duty of commission to refer case to powers of
panel—Findings and report—Objections to report—Hearing—Expenses.—
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or for
death, arising out of or in the course of employment, and where the employer or insurance carrier denies liability, the commission shall refer the
medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the commission and having the qualifications generally applicable to the medical
panel set forth in section 35-2-56, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
The medical panel shall make such study, take such X-rays and perform
such tests, including post-mortem examinations where authorized by the
commission, as it may determine and thereafter shall make a report in
writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the commission, and
shall make such additional findings as the commission may require. The
commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report of the panel
to the claimant, the employer and the insurance carrier by registered mail
with return receipt requested. Within fifteen days after such report is deposited in the United States post office, the claimant, the employer or
the insurance carrier may file with the commission objections in writing
thereto. If no objections are so filed within such period, the report shall be
deemed admitted in evidence and the commission may base its finding and
decision on the report of the panel, but shall not be bound by such report if
there is other substantial conflicting evidence in the case which supports
a contrary finding by the commission. If objections to such report are
filed it shall be the duty of the commission to set the case for hearing within thirty days to determine the facts and issues involved, and at such
hearing any party so desiring may request the commission to have the
chairman of the medical panel present at the hearing for examination and
cross-examination. For good cause shown the commission may order other
members of the panel with or without the chairman, to be present at the
hearing for examination and cross-examination. Upon such hearing the
written report of the panel may be received as an exhibit but shall not be
considered as evidence in the case except in so far as it is sustained by the
testimony admitted. The expenses of such study and report by the medical
panel and of their appearance before the commission shall be paid out of
the fund provided for by section 35-1-68, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1979 amendment substituted "applicant" for "claimant" in the third and fourth
sentences; deleted "within thirty days" after
"set the case for hearing" in the sixth sentence; and made minor changes in phraseology.

"APPENDIX A"

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I served four copies of this Brief on
Robert J. Shaughnessy, 543 E 500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, Attorney for Delbert W. Wallace, the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Hearing Room, 160 East 300 South P.O. Box 5800, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84110-5800 and Second Injury Fund, 160 East 300
South P.O. Box 5800 Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-5800, by causing the
same to be placed in the United States Mail, postage pre-paid.

